Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 2012 | Number 2

Article 4

Fall 3-2-2012

Diminished Rights of Parents to Seek
Reimbursement Under the IDEA for Unilateral
Placement of Their Children in Private Schools
Ralph D. Mawdsley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Disability and Equity in Education Commons, and the Education Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Diminished Rights of Parents to Seek Reimbursement Under the IDEA for Unilateral Placement of Their Children in
Private Schools, 2012 BYU Educ. & L.J. 303 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2012/iss2/4

.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF PARENTS TO SEEK
REIMBURSEMENT UNDER THE IDEA FOR
UNILATERAL PLACEMENT OF THEIR CHILDREN IN
PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D.

I. INTRODUCTION
Forest Grove School District v. TA.l has served to reframe
the discussion of whether or not parents are entitled to
reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Act
(IDEA) for unilaterally placing their children in private
schools.2 In Forest Grove, parents sought reimbursement for
the expense of placing their child in a private school, even
though the child had not been receiving special education
services prior to the placement. In landmark decisions in
School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of
Massachusetts3 and Florence County School District Four v.
Carter,4 the Supreme Court had determined that such
reimbursement was permissible under the IDEA since it was
not to be considered a damages award. Both Burlington and
Florence County ruled on behalf of parents by focusing on the
failure of the public school districts to provide appropriate
services. As discussed later in this Article, four years after
Florence County, Congress amended the IDEA to impose notice
requirements on parents seeking reimbursement for their
children's private school placements.
Forest Grove has served to tighten the analysis as to
whether parents are entitled to reimbursement, and, in effect,

1. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Or. 2005), rev'd and
remanded, 52:3 F.ad 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), af{'d, 557 U.S. 2:~0 (2009), remanded to 675 F.
Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Or. 2009), af('d, 6:'38 F.i3d 12:34 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. The term "unilateral parent placement" does not appear directly in the IDEA
but is a concept derived from the federal statute, which refers to parents having
"enroll[ed] a child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the
consent of or referral by the public agency." 20 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(IO)(C)(ii) (2012).
3. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 4 71 U.S. :359 (1985).
4. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).

303

304

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2012

to make such reimbursement more difficult to obtain. The
Supreme Court decision m Forest Grove introduced a
balancing-of-equities
approach
for
exammmg
the
appropriateness of parental reimbursement-an approach that
has served to broaden the scope of judicial inquiry beyond a
public school district's compliance with the IDEA and focus, as
well, on the responsibilities of parents. Some of the issues that
are now given prominence in the balancing process include the
following: whether the parents have provided notice to the
school district of their intention to place their child in a private
school, whether the private school was equipped to address the
child's disability, and whether the primary responsibility for
balancing equities rests with federal district courts.
Guarded optimism after Forest Grove that parental
reimbursement for private school placement might be more
readily available has not been realized,5 as reflected in postForest Grove court of appeals decisions. The Forest Grove
Supreme Court's affirmation of a balancing-of-equities process
has suggested that the federal district courts will have an
enhanced role in managing the process.
In the most recent of the Forest Grove decisions, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a federal district court decision that parents,
after six years of litigation, were not entitled to reimbursement
for placement of their child in a private school. This Article will
address the following: (1) the pre-Forest Grove early ground
rules from Burlington and Florence County regarding parental
reimbursement, (2) Congress' post-Burlington and -Florence
County IDEA amendments affecting reimbursement, (3) the
effect of the balancing of equities on parental reimbursement,
(4) the efforts by federal circuits to furnish definition and
meaning to the balancing-of-equities process, and (5) the role of
federal district courts in managing the balancing process.

5. Cf. Brianna L. Lennon, Cut And Run? Tuition Reimbursement and the 1997
IDEA Amendments, 75 Mo. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2010) ("Forest Grove School District v.
T.A. clearly shows that the U.S. Supreme Court favors the rights of parents of special
needs children over the autonomy of schools.") with Perry Zirkel, Legal Currency in
Special Education Law: Top Ten for School Leaders, 262 ED. LAW REI'. 1, 1 n.ilO (2011)
("[Forest Grove] received considerable media attention, generally being hailed as a
major victory for parents of children with disabilities. However, the issue was a narrow
and relatively rare one, and the decision was inconclusive in terms of the ultimate
outcome. Indeed, in this specific case, the parents ultimately lost on remand.").
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II. BURLINGTON AND FLORENCE COUNTY: THE EARLY
REIMBURSEMENT GROUND RULES
A. School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education
of Massachusetts
In Burlington, parents and the school district differed as to
the nature of a child's disability and his appropriate
placement.6 The school district designed an Individualized
Education Program (IEP)7 for the student that set a goal for
improvement in math and reading at only four months for the
entire school year and provided only three hours of
individualized instruction per week. The parents placed their
child in a private school from which he graduated three years
later. In ruling on behalf of the parents and upholding their
right to reimbursement for the expenses associated with their
private school placement, the Supreme Court determined that
the broad grant of authority in the IDEA for a federal court to
"grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate"S
included reimbursement.9 The Court reasoned that it would be
"an empty victory" if "conscientious parents who have adequate
means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment"
were informed several years after the judicial review process
that their expenditures could not be reimbursed by school
officials.lO "If that were the case, the child's right to a free
appropriate public education [FAPE], the parents' right to
participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the
procedural safeguards would be less than complete."ll The
Court characterized reimbursement not as damages but as
"expenses that [the school district] should have paid all along
6. See Burlington, 171 U.S. at 362 ("the Town [school committee] believ[ed] the
source [of the student's learning difficulties] ... to he emotional and the [plaintiff]
parents believ[edj it to be neurological.").
7. 20 U.S.C. §1101(14) (2012) ("The term 'individualized education program' or
'lEI'' means a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed,
reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1411(d) of this title.").
8. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
9. Burlington, 171 U.S. at 369.
10. Jd. at :370.
11. /d.
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and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a
proper IEP."12 In rejecting the district's argument that the
parents had waived their claim to reimbursement by
unilaterally placing their child in a private school before the
end of the administrative due process hearing, the Court
asserted that the IDEA did not impose a Hobson's Choice13 on
parents either to leave the child in what may turn out to be an
inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for
reimbursement. The [IDEA] was intended to give handicapped
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those
objectives.14
However, the Court closed with a cautionary note:
parents who unilaterally change their child's placement
during the pendency of review proceedings, without the
consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own
financial risk. If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP
proposed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents
would be barred from obtaining reimbursement .... 15

B. Florence County School District Four v. Carter
The Supreme Court's Florence County decision reinforced
the Court's position in Burlington that parents have a right
under the IDEA to unilaterally place their children in a private
school and a right to be reimbursed if the public school district
failed to provide a FAPE.16 In Florence County, parents
rejected a public school's IEP for their child classified as
learning disabled, where the IEP provided that the child
"would stay in regular classes except for three periods of
12. Id. at 371.
13. 0XFOHD ENGLISH DICTIONAHY (2d ed. 1989) ("The option of taking the one
thing offered or nothing.").
14. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372.
15. !d. at 373-7 4.
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1101(9) (2012). "The term '[FAPE]' means special education and
related services that- (A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individuali7,ed education program required under section H 11(d) of this title."
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individualized instruction per week, and established specific
goals in reading and mathematics of four months' progress for
the entire school year."17 The parents requested an
administrative due process hearing, which was eventually held
at both the local and state levels18 for the public school.19
While the hearings were in progress, the parents placed their
child at the beginning of her tenth year of school in Trident
Academy, "a private school specializing in educating children
with disabilities."20 The student remained there for three years
and graduated.
In holding that the parents were entitled to reimbursement
for the expenses associated with placing their child in a private
school, the Supreme Court noted that a parent's choice of a
private school was not subject to the same F APE requirements
imposed on public schools. The Court observed that to apply to
parents the F APE requirement that education in private
schools be '"provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction' ... would effectively eliminate the
right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington. "21
Regarding the school district's claim that the parents should
not be eligible for reimbursement because Trident Academy did
not "meet state education standards" in that it "employed at
least two faculty members who were not state-certified and ...
did not develop IEP's [sic]," the Court succinctly declared that
the IDEA's FAPE requirements "[did] not apply to private
parental placements .... Parents' failure to select a program
known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved
option is not itself a bar to reimbursement."22
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the public school
district's financial concerns that permitting reimbursement
where parents have unilaterally chosen a private school
represents a hardship for the school district where, if parents
17. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993).
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(l) (2012) (IDEA requires a two-tiered administrative
review process by which a hearing is conducted by local educational agencies; in such
case, ag!-,>Tieved parties must have the opportunity to appeal to the state educational
agency (usually, the state department of education)).
19. Florence Cnty., 510 U.S. at 10.
20. Jd.
21. I d. at 1:3 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9)(A) (1993)).
22. ld. at 14.
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are not limited to state-approved private schools, "States will
have to reimburse dissatisfied parents for any private school
that provides an education that is proper under the [IDEA], no
matter how expensive it may be."23 While acknowledging the
financial hardship to public school districts, the Court
admonished those districts that they can avoid the financial
burden of reimbursing parents for unilateral placements by
doing one of two things: "giv[ing] the child a [FAPE] in a public
setting, or plac[ing] the child in an appropriate private setting
of the State's choice."24
The Court closed with two cautionary observations that
were to provide the basis for subsequent lower court
interpretations and the 1997 congressional amendments of the
IDEA regarding reimbursement. The Court noted:
[parents] are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court
concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and
that the private school placement was proper under the
[IDEA] .... Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief
under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that
should be required. Total reimbursement will not be
appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the
private education was unreasonable.25

Thus, while the Court in Florence County directed its
attention primarily at the failure of the public school district to
provide a FAPE, it also laid the groundwork for examining the
appropriateness of the parents' choice of private school. Also in
its Florence County decision, the Court grasped the policy
implications for public school districts if parents' private school
choices were not also required to address the issue of
appropriateness.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE IDEA CONCERNING
REIMBURSEMENT
the

Four years after Florence County, Congress intervened in
private placement debate and amended the IDEA,
15.

2a.

!d. at

24.

ld.
Florence Cnty.,

25.

510 U.S. at 16.

DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF PARENTS

2]

309

declaring that parents had certain responsibilities to fulfill
towards the public school districts if they expected the school
districts to reimburse them for the cost of unilateral
placements.
Congress'
directions
regarding
parental
requirements involved both a requirement to furnish notice
and a warning of possible non-reimbursement if the notice was
not provided:
(ii) Reimbursement for private school placement
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously

received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private
elementary school or secondary school without the consent of
or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer
may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost
of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the
agency had not made a [FAPE] available to the child in a
timely manner prior to that enrollment.
(iii) Limitation on reimbursement
The cost of reimbursement described m clause (ii) may be
reduced or denied(I) if- (aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents
attended prior to removal of the child from the public school,
the parents did not inform the IEP Team that they were
rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to
provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their
concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private
school at public expense; or (bb) 10 business days (including
any holidays that occur on a business day) prior to the
removal of the child from the public school, the parents did
not give written notice to the public agency of the information
described in item (aa).26

Although the 1997 amendments were somewhat lacking in
the forcefulness of their warnings to parents, they did
legitimize a standard and a process for examining the
appropriateness of services and placement decisions of a FAPE.
Nonetheless, the 1997 amendments have become as important
for what they do not address as for what they do:

26.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a)(10)(C)(ii), (iii) (2012).
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(1) the amendments speak to the public school's
requirement to provide a F APE, but not to which party bears
the burden of proof regarding the services necessary to satisfy
a FAPE;27
(2) while the public school is required under the IDEA to
provide a placement in the least restrictive environment,28 the
amendments are silent as to whether reimbursement is
available if the parents' placement is more restrictive than the
public school's (as it generally has tended to be);29
(3) although the public school district is required to
implement services specified under an IEP, the amendments
are silent as to whether reimbursement could be denied if the
parents' placement was not able to implement some or all of
the services designed for the IEP;30
(4) because the amendments focused on private school
placements, it is not clear whether reimbursement is available
for additional services purchased by parents if the child

27. See Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Schs., 208 F.3d 560 (6th Cir.
2000) (rejecting parent reimbursement for cost of Loovas training at home where the
parent had failed to carry the burden of proof of showing that public school"s IEP was
inappropriate). But see Jennifer D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 2d 120
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding parents entitled to reimbursement where they had satisfied a
two-part burden of proof under Schaffer v. Wuest, 516 U.S. 19 (2005), that the public
school"s IEP was inappropriate because it failed to mainstream a disabled student to
the maximum extent appropriate, while the parents' private school choice was
appropriate since it provided a lower pupil-teacher ratio); Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004) (in upholding reimbursement for parents' providing
home-based Loovas instruction, the Sixth Circuit held that "[p]arents are entitled to
retroactive reimbursement if the school district failed to provide the student with a
FAPE and if the private placement chosen by the parents was reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits."). !d. at 866.
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(5) (2012).
29. See Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 114 F.:ld :l91
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that parents' placement of disabled child in a private school
that admitted only children with disabilities did not prevent reimbursement. The Sixth
Circuit observed, "It will commonly be the case that parents who have not been treated
properly under the IDEA, and who exercise the right of parental placement, will place
their child in a school that specializes in teaching children with disabilities and thus
will not satisfy the mainstreaming requirement. Adopting such a limitation on
parental placements would therefore effectively vitiate that remedy."). !d. at 400 n.7.
30. See Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 189 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that parents were not entitled to reimbursement for cost of private school
where it did not contain a therapeutic setting provided for in the lEI'; "[p]arents who
seek reimbursement bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement
was appropriate, even if the lEP was inappropriate.").
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continues in the public school's placement;31
(5) the amendments are silent as to the issues of cost of
residential placements, the failure of parents to provide notice,
and the adequacy of the private facility in providing a
meaningful educational benefit;32 and
(6) the amendments are silent as to whether a parent could
recover reimbursement for a child placed in a private school
even though that child had never received special education
services.33
IV. FOREST GROVE'S INFLUENCE ON ADDRESSING PARENTAL
REIMBURSEMENT

A. First Ninth Circuit Decision
Despite-and perhaps because of-Congress' rather
ambivalent directive in its 1997 IDEA amendments, the Ninth
Circuit's Forest Grove decisions have asserted judicial, as
opposed to administrative,34 control over the balancing-ofequities process. In the first Ninth Circuit decision, the court
reversed a federal district court decision that parents of a child
with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) were
precluded from reimbursement for parental unilateral private
school placement where the child had not "previously received

31. See Mora v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 768 A.2d 901 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (a
Part C case upholding reimbursement for a family that had "provided private services
to supplement inadequate [Individualized Family Service Plan] services and the child
[had made] progress toward her goals as a result of the combination of services"). Id. at
908.
:32. See Richardson lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.:3d 286 (5th Cir. 2009)
(rewrsing federal district court $56,000 reimbursement to parents calculated from the
date that the school district had reasonable notice of the parents' intent to place their
child in the private school and ending on the date that the child was removed from the
private residential school and remanding to district court to determine whether, even
though the child's treatment at private residential facility was necessary to receive a
meaningful educational benefit, the facility chosen by the parents was primarily
oriented toward enabling her to receive a meaningful educational benefit).
:33. See Frank G. v. Bd. of !~due. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that failure to have student in public school did not prevent reimbursement
where public school placement would have involved a classroom with too many
children).
:H. The IDEA requires that claimants exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking judicial remedies. Administrative rulings by hearing officers are subject to
judicial review. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(t), (g), (I) (2012).
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special education and related services under the authority of a
public agency."35 The Ninth Circuit found that the district
court's interpretation would not only have the effect of
reversing Congress' and the Supreme Court's clear expression
"that all children with disabilities have available to them a
[FAPE],"36 but would lead to the absurd result that the parents
of a child with a disability must wait (an indefinite, perhaps
lengthy period) until the child has received special education in
public school before sending the child to an appropriate private
school, no matter how uncooperative the school district and no
matter how inappropriate the special education.:37
In place of a rigid interpretation of the IDEA, the Ninth
Circuit substituted a balancing-of-equities analysis whereby
the district court could consider various factors, such as "the
existence of other, more suitable placements, the effort
expended by the parents in securing alternative placements,
and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of the
school district,"38 on remand to address whether the parents
were entitled to reimbursement. The court went further and, in
its parting comment, observed that the district court was free
to consider the hearing officer's finding that T.A.'s parents had
sent him to their private placement, Mount Bachelor Academy,
"not only because of his disabilities, but also for reasons
unrelated to his disabilities (i.e., substance abuse and
behavioral problems)."39 In effect, the Ninth Circuit implied
that the balancing-of-equities approach could result in parents
not being reimbursed, even though a school district failed to
provide FAPE. Thus, if a hearing officer found that the primary
reasons for private placement were a child's behavioral
problems not considered to be the result of a disability, the
parents might not be entitled to reimbursement.

35. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
36. Id. § 1400(d)(l)(A) (emphasis added); see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v.
Dep't of Educ. of Mass .. 4 71 U .8. 359, 369-70 (1985).
37. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd,
557 U.S. 230 (2009), remanded to 675 F. Supp. 2d 106a (D. Or. 2009), aff'd, 6:-l8 F.ad
12:-34 (9th Cir. 2011).
38. Id. at 1089 (citing W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target J{ange Sch. Dist. No. 2:-l, 960
F.2d 1479, 1186 (9th Cir. 1992)).
:l9. Jd.

2]

DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF PARENTS

313

B. Supreme Court Decision
Prior to the remand to the district court, the Supreme Court
reinforced the Ninth Circuit's balancing-of-equities directive,
noting in response to the school district's concern about the
financial consequences of unilateral private placements that
"courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a
reimbursement award if the equities so warrant."40 Because
parents who place their children in private settings pending
review proceedings do so "at their own financial risk,"41 the
Supreme Court concluded that "the incidence of private-school
placement at public expense is quite small."42

C. Federal District Court Decision on Remand
On remand, the federal district court rejected the parents'
claim that, in the absence of abuse by a hearing officer, the
court was required to defer to the due process hearing officer's
decision, which, in this case, had directed reimbursement for
the parents. The district court determined that, in interpreting
the IDEA, while it must accept the facts as found by the
hearing officer, it could "exercise ... independent judgment
based on a preponderance of the evidence as to whether the
legal conclusions reached by the hearing officer [were]
supported by the facts."43 This district court assertion over the
balancing-of-equities process was confirmed on the second
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, where the court of appeals noted
that it could "reverse a district court's decision under an abuse
of discretion standard only if the district court's decision was

40. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 247.
41. !d. (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1998))
(quotation marks omitted).
42. !d. See Brief for Nat'! Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting J{espondent, Forest Grove, 52:3 F.::ld 1078, 2009 WL 906567, at *13-14 ("The
percentage of children receiving services under the IDEA in publicly funded private
placements has not changed significantly over the last 2a years. Since 1985, an average
of 1.'14'% of all children served each year under the IDEA were in private placements at
public expense. For the past two years for which national data are available, in 2006
only 0.97% of children with disabilities were in private placements at public expense
(57,078 out of 5,888,227 children), and in 2007 the percentage was only 1.1::3% of
children (66,648 children out of 5,882,8::35 children).").
1:~.
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (D. Or. 2009),
af{'d, 638 F.:ld 1234 (9th Cir. 2011).
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'[1] illogical, [2] implausible, or [3] without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record."'44
In effect, the Ninth Circuit's approach to the balancing of
equities suggests that the primary decision-making body in
that process is the federal district court. During their second
review of the facts in Forest Grove, both the federal district and
Ninth Circuit courts weighed the facts against reimbursing the
parents. While the public school district's failure in Forest
Grove to follow up on T.A.'s suspected ADHD under "other
health impairments"45 weighed in favor of the parents, both
courts found determinative the parents' decision to send T.A. to
the private school "after he admitted to using marijuana on a
fairly regular basis, was occasionally so drugged that he could
not get out of bed or speak, made over $1,000 worth of
telephone calls to sex talk lines, scanned Internet pornography
sites, and ran away from home."46 As the district court
pointedly observed, "ADHD and trouble with schoolwork were
not among the reasons listed."47
In its conclusion that "[t]he equities do not favor requiring
the District to reimburse T.A.'s parents for a decision to send
T.A. to a school because of his drug abuse and behavioral
problems that are unrelated to his difficulties focusing in
school," the federal district court also reflected on the parents'
and school district's responsibilities under the IDEA:
it is important to note that the District's responsibility under
the IDEA is to remedy the learning related symptoms of a
disability, not to treat the underlying disability, or to treat
other, non-learning related symptoms. The District certainly
cannot begin treating a student's underlying medical
44. Forest Grove, 638 F.3d at 12:~8 (quoting United States v. Hinkson. 585 F.:ld
1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en bane)).
·15. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012). "Other Health Impairment" is defined in the
Oregon Administrative Regulations to mean "limited strength, vitality, or alertness,
including a heightened alertness to environmental stimuli that results in limited
alertness with respect to the educational environment, that: (A) Is due to chronic or
acute health problems (e.g. a heart condition, tuberculosis, rheumatic fever, nephritis,
asthma, sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead poisoning, attention deficit
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, leukemia, Tourette's syndrome or
diabetes); and (B) Adversely affects a child's educational performance." OR. ADMIN. K
581-015-2000(4)(h) (2012).
46. Forest Grove, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
47. ld.
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disability, whether it be ADHD or some other mental or
physical disability. That responsibility rests with the parents
and medical professionals. 48

In addition, the district court wove into the balancing of
equities the cost of the parents' private choice, especially in
light of the parents' failure to investigate other options.49 As
the district court noted, the parents' private school choice cost
$5,200 per month, which, if one were to consider the school
psychologist's estimation of five to ten percent of the students
in the Forest Grove School District suffering from ADHD,
would cost "$1,428,000 to $2,964,000 a month, or $12,852,000
to $26,676,000 a year, assuming a nine month school year."50

D. Second Ninth Circuit Decision
In its review of the second federal district court decision in

Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision on behalf of the school district, reflecting on the broad
discretion accorded federal district courts in reimbursement
cases to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the
evidence. Thus, the mere fact that parents may have had an
equity factor in their favor does not require a district court,
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to rule on
behalf of the parents.5l As the Ninth Circuit so succinctly
expressed, the balancing of equities meant that "the district
court was not required to award reimbursement to T.A. simply
because T.A.'s enrollment in private school was motivated in
part by his disabilities.''52 Thus, since T.A.'s private school
enrollment was "motivated by reasons both related and
unrelated to his disabilities, the [district] court could have held
the non-disability reasons so outweighed the disability reasons

18. /d. at 1068.
19. !d. at 1067. ("'!'.A's parents do not appear to have done significant research
into schools specializing in dealing with children with ADHD and depression to
determine the best placement for T.A Instead they chose the first school mentioned by
['I' .A.'s independent psychologist] and enrolled T.A. without even visiting [it].").
50. !d. at 1068.
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1115(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2012) (in an appeal from a hearing officer's
decision to a court, the court, "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.").
52. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 6:38 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011).
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as to make reimbursement inequitable."53
What is apparent from the Ninth Circuit's second Forest
Grove decision is that federal district courts have the authority
pursuant to balancing equities to select the facts that are to be
given greater or lesser emphasis for purposes of
reimbursement. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found
reasonable the district court's placement of greater emphasis
on the parents' response of "inappropriate and oppositional
behavior and drug use"54 to an application question about the
specific event for selecting the private school, even though the
parents had also referenced elsewhere in the application "T.A.'s
academic difficulties and ADHD."55 The Ninth Circuit sought
to assuage the sensitivities of parents who may feel punished if
they seek private placements that "address 'all of their child's
needs"'56 by observing that "in this case the district court's
determination that T.A. enrolled at [the private school] due to
his behavior and drug problems was not illogical, implausible,
or without support in inferences which may be drawn from
facts in the record."57
V. POST-FOREST GROVE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS: WHAT
DOES "BALANCING OF EQUITIES" MEAN?

The Ninth Circuit in Forest Grove accorded to federal
district courts within its circuit broad latitude in drawing legal
conclusions regarding the facts as long as those conclusions
were not "[1] illogical, [2] implausible, or [3] without support in
inferences."58 However, the extent to which federal district
courts have as much latitude in determining parental
reimbursement as suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Forest
Grove is not clear. Although the Supreme Court in Forest Grove
endorsed the balancing-of-equities approach to addressing
parent reimbursement disputes, the Court did not determine
how federal district courts and courts of appeals are to
interpret F APE in the balancing process. Perhaps reflecting
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

Id.
/d. at 1240 (quotation marks omitted).
ld.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Forest Graue, 638 F.:id at 1238.
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the relative newness of this balancing-of-equities process,
federal circuits have not necessarily been in agreement as to
how much discretion to accord federal district courts.
In C. B. v. Special School District No. 1,59 a federal district
court in the Eighth Circuit reversed a hearing officer's decision
that parents were entitled to be reimbursed for unilaterally
placing their child in a private school, even though the district
court agreed with the parents that the school district had failed
to provide a FAPE for four-and-a-half years.60 However,
finding that "[n]inety percent of the students at [the parents'
choice of private school had] IEPs and the remaining students
had some learning or attention issues,"61 the district court held
that the private school was "not an appropriate placement for
[the student] because it [did] not offer him an education in the
least restrictive environment."62 Notwithstanding four-and-ahalf years of failing to provide a F APE, the parent placement63
was found inappropriate because "the record [did] not show
that the nature and severity of [the student's] learning
disability could not be adequately addressed in the less
restrictive public school setting."64
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court
decision and ordered reimbursement for the parents for one
year of private school placement. The Eighth Circuit found that
the mainstreaming preference of the IDEA did not make the
parents' private school choice an inappropriate private
placement under the circumstances because the statute calls
for educating children with disabilities together "with children
who are not disabled to the maximum extent possible."65 In a
sweeping statement, the Eighth Circuit declared that the
parents in this case had a "right of unilateral withdrawal"66
and a right to reimbursement for private tuition, so long as the
C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011), reu'g 641 F.
850 (D. Minn. 2009).
C. B., 611 F. Supp. 2d 850.
!d. at 856.
62. /d.
63. The parents furnished the school district with the notice required under the
IDEA. See C.B., 636 F.:3d at 986.
61. C. B .. 611 F. Supp. 2d at 856.
65. ld. (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2009)).
66. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993).

59.
Supp. 2d
60.
61.
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placement was "proper under the [IDEA],"67and the award
"further[ed] the purposes of the [IDEA]."68 Paying little
attention to the district court's factfinding and legal
conclusions, the Eighth Circuit held that "[r]eimbursement for
the costs of enrollment in a private school is authorized if the
hearing officer finds that the District 'had not made a [FAPE]
available to the child in a timely manner prior to that
enrollment."'69 For the benefit of future federal district court
decisions concerning parental reimbursement in the Eighth
Circuit, the court of appeals aligned itself with "the Third and
Sixth Circuits in concluding that a private placement need not
satisfy a least-restrictive environment requirement to be
'proper' under the [IDEA]."70 In effect, the Eighth Circuit
altered the balancing of equities by eliminating one of the
factors-the least restrictive environment-from the balancing
process.
The result of a balancing-of-equities process where a public
school district has not furnished a F APE could be expected to
change where the school district has furnished a F APE. In P.P.
ex rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area School District, 71 the
Third Circuit upheld a federal district court decision (affirming
a hearing officer and appeals panel) finding that, where a
public school district had made available a FAPE to a student,
the parents were not entitled to reimbursement. 72 The Third
Circuit upheld the district court's balancing of equities that
included among the complex facts of the case, a child who had
never attended the public school, 73 a disputed written parent

67. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 1\71 U. S. :l59, 369
(1985).
68. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, 557 U.S. 280, 21\2 n.9 (2009).
69. C.I3. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981, 991 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 20
U.S.C. § H12(a)(lO)(C)(ii) (2011) (emphasis added)).
70. Id. See Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.:3d 80, 83-81\ (:3d
Cir.1999); Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 3991\00 (6th Cir.1998).
71. P.P. ex rei. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.:3d 727 (:3d Cir.
2009).
72. Id. at 7:39. However, the hearing officer had awarded 102 hours of
compensatory damages because of the school district delay in evaluation, an award
that was reversed by the appeals panel and upheld by the federal district court and the
Third Circuit. Id. at 737.
7:3. See id. at 7:lO ("During the 2001-2005 school years, when he was in
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notice to evaluate their child, 74 and a disputed IEP that
contained most but not all of the evaluations requested in an
Independent Educational Evaluation. 75 The most damaging
factor in the balancing process against the parents, though,
was the district court and Third Circuit's finding that the
motivation for the parents' placement of their child in a private
school was not due to his disabilities, but their having sent, in
June 2005,
a tmtwn deposit to Benchmark[, the private school, and
having] financed the Benchmark tuition through AMS, a
program that fronts the entire year's tuition to a private
school and requires that parents repay the bank on a monthly
basis, with limited opportunity for parents to opt out of full
payment if their child does not attend the private school. 76
Thus, while the student in P.P., unlike the student in Forest
Grove, had "never enrolled in the [School] District in the first
place,"77 the difference has no relevance where the school
district in P.P. not only had provided a F APE, but the parents'
motivation m pursumg a private placement had been
impugned.
Forest Grove, C.B., and P.P. suggest that the judiciary's
equitable authority will fall on the side of school districts where
they have furnished a FAPE. However, parents face other
equitable trip wires in their claim for reimbursement besides
the issue ofFAPE. The Third Circuit, in C. H. v. Cape Henlopen
School District, ruled that parents who have failed to provide
kindergarten through third grade, Patrick went to a parochial school, St. Maximillian
Kolbe .... During the summer of 2005, and in the 2005-2006 school year, when he was
in fourth grade, he attended the Benchmark School ... , a private school for children
with disabilities.").
74. /d. at 737 (the Third Circuit found "not credible" the parents' claim that they
had sent written notice in January 2003, determining instead that a November 22,
2004 date which was the first one for which the parents had documentation of their
demand).
75. /d. at 7a2. The school district's refusal to provide a math evaluation was
upheld where the child was performing at an average level and refusal to conduct
assessments of their son's social and emotional function where the parents' report
stated that their son was happy, social, and responsible, the evaluators found that the
studl,nt was "pleasant, joyful, and engaging[, and his] teachers described him as
positive and motivated." /d. at n.l.
76. !d. at 7:~2.
77. P.f'., 585 F.:ld at 739 n.4.
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school districts with notice that they intend to place their
children in private schools, as specified in the IDEA, may not
be entitled to any reimbursement, even if the school has failed
to furnish a FAPE.78 The 1997 amendments to the IDEA, as
referenced above, allowed for reduction or denial of
reimbursement for unilateral parental placement in a private
school if the parents failed to provide notice of such placement
"at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended
prior to removal of the child from the public school."79 Citing
Forest Grove, the Third Circuit in C.H. noted that "courts
retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reimbursement
award if the equities so warrant."SO Even though the Supreme
Court's Forest Grove decision had not been handed down until
after the district court decision in C.H., the Third Circuit,
applying the equities to the facts, found the equities favored
the school district's side where
the Parents unilaterally withdrew C.H. from the District
without any prior notice to the District[,] . . . [and where]
delaying the continuation of the IEP meeting and cancelling
the speech and language evaluation substantially precluded
any possibility that the District could timely develop an
appropriate IEP for C.H. and provide the necessary services
to him, [so] that the parties could resolve this dispute without
resort to litigation.Sl

Giving full equitable force to the IDEA's parental notice
requirement, the Third Circuit declared that "[t]he IDEA was
not intended to fund private school tuition for the children of
parents who have not first given the public school a good faith
opportunity to meet its obligations."82
However, even though the Forest Grove balancing-ofequities standard can present challenges for parents seeking
reimbursement for having placed children in private schools,
the breadth of the discretion granted to federal courts can work
to the parents' advantage, as well. In Ferren C. v. School
District of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit interpreted Forest
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.ad 59 (:Jd Cir. 2010).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012).
C.H., 606 F. 3d at 71 (quotation marks omitted).
/d.
/d. at 72.
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Grove as asserting that "the Supreme Court declined to limit
courts' discretion in granting equitable relief under the
IDEA."S:3 In Ferren, the Third Circuit, in the shadow of Forest
Grove, addressed the authority of federal courts to apply an
equitable remedy under compensatory education. In a
somewhat complex set of facts, the student in Ferren had
attended a private school from 2004 to 2007 with the costs
being paid from a trust fund established by the school
district.84 In 2007, the student turned twenty-one. The private
school which she attended did not usually educate students
past the age of twenty-one; however, it agreed to continue
educating the student so long as the school district agreed to
continue funding the student's education, which it agreed to do
through 2010.85
However, after the student turned twenty-one, the school
district stated that it intended to graduate the student at the
end of the 2007 school year since it had no further obligations
under the IDEA once a student with disabilities turned twentyone.86
The school district's decision presented two problems for the
private school: (1) it could not graduate the student unless the
school district notified it that public school obligations under
compensatory education had been satisfied, a notification that
the school district did not (and, presumably would not) furnish
to the private school; and (2) the school district, while willing to
continue to pay the private school tuition from the trust fund,
would no longer provide IEPs or serve as the local education
authority (LEA).87 Both the hearing officer and the
administrative appeals panel found for the school district,
ruling "that the School District was not required to provide
Ferren with an IEP during the three-year compensatory
education period."SS A federal district court reversed the
8:l. Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'g 595 F.
Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
H1. !d. at 715.
85. /d.
86. /d. at 715-16.
87. /d. at 715 (while the private school can prepare an IEP without the
involvement of a puhlic school district, it required that a student's home school district
sign the I El' and serve as the student's LEA).
88. /d. at 716.
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administrative decisions and "ordered the School District for
the duration of her three years of compensatory education to
annually reevaluate Ferren, provide her with annual IEPs, and
serve as her LEA."89 The Third Circuit reviewed the district
court's equitable remedy under an abuse of discretion
standard.90 The court of appeals opined that, although
compensatory education is "a judicially created remedy" not
found in the IDEA, it falls within the equitable power accorded
to courts under the IDEA.91 Thus, while the IDEA limits a
school district's obligation to provide a F APE only to students
under the age of twenty-one,92 an individual over that age is
still eligible for compensatory education for a school district's
failure to provide a FAPE prior to the student turning twentyone.93 To allow the school district in Ferren to fulfill its
obligation to make up for past failures only paying for private
school tuition would frustrate the very purpose of setting up
the trust fund because "Ferren could not remain at [the private
school] without the School District providing IEPs and serving
as Ferren's LEA."94 The Third Circuit concluded that the
equitable relief granted by the district court was "appropriate"
under the IDEA because the District Court had weighed "the
interests of finality, efficiency, and use of the School District's
resources with the compelling needs of Ferren and her
family."95 The court of appeals concluded that, based on the
specific facts of this case, the equitable award was appropriate
to further the purposes of the IDEA because it will "ensure that
Ferren's educational rights under the IDEA are enforced and
that she receives the education to which she was statutorily
entitled."96

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
(E.D. Pa.
96.

Ferren, 612 F.3d at 716.
/d.
!d. at 717.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012).
See also Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Ferren, 612 F.3d at 719.
Id. at 718 (quoting Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila, 595 F. Supp. 2d 566, 578
2009)) (quotation marks omitted).
Jd. at 719.
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A. Analysis and Implications

Forest Grove sends a less-than-clear message to parents
concerning reimbursement for unilateral placement in private
schools. What is also unclear is how the Supreme Court's
balancing-of-equities approach in addressing reimbursement
cases will affect the relationships between hearing officers and
federal district courts and between district courts and courts of
appeals. Whether the Supreme Court's Forest Grove decision
enhances the role of federal district courts as the guardians of
public school district funds and their expenditure for unilateral
parental placement in private schools remains to be seen.
The balancing-of-equities process requires hearing officers
and courts to determine two separate issues. First, a school
district's failure to provide a FAPE must be balanced against
the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of the parents'
placement decision. In effect, reimbursement cases under a
balancing process have a substantive aspect and a school
district's failure to furnish a FAPE may not be, in itself,
sufficient justification for reimbursement.
Second, courts of appeals must decide what deference, if
any, is due the decisions of the various administrative and
judicial decision-makers that are part of the review process.
Questions such as the relationship between procedural and
substantive violations of the IDEA, whether parents have
complied with the IDEA's notice requirements before placing
their child in a private placement, and the appropriateness of
the private school placement present both factual and legal
issues. Defining the deference that a federal circuit court of
appeals should provide to hearing-level and lower court
decisions in post-Forest Grove reimbursement cases is far from
clear.
In Richardson Independent School District v. Michael Z.,97
two months after Forest Grove, the Fifth Circuit reversed a
hearing officer's $56,000 reimbursement award to parents plus
an additional $54,714.40 reimbursement and $36,768.20 in
attorneys' fees and costs by the district court. With only a
passing reference to Forest Grove, the Fifth Circuit applied the
de novo standard of review for questions of law and a "clear
97.

Hichardson Indep.

s~h.

Dist. v.

Mi~hael

Z., 580 F.3d 286, 301 (5th Cir. 2009).
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error" standard for questions of fact. 98 In remanding to the
district court, the Fifth Circuit instructed the court that, even
though a school district had failed to furnish an IEP providing
a FAPE, which resulted in the child's failed progress, the Fifth
Circuit would not uphold the parents' residential placement
unless they could prove not only that their placement was
"essential in order for the disabled child to receive a
meaningful educational benefit, [but also that it was] primarily
oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an education."99
The Fifth Circuit observed that "[the] IDEA ... does not
require school districts to bear the costs of private residential
placements" that are not essential for a disabled child to
receive an education;lOO balancing of equities requires that
parents produce evidence that their child's treatment at their
placement choice is "primarily oriented towards [i.e., primarily
designed for and directed to] enabling the child to receive a
meaningful educational benefit."101 Thus, while the Supreme
Court's balancing of equities in Forest Grove has affected a
parent's burden of proof, Richardson suggests no change by
courts of appeals in according a standard of review less than de
novo.
Approximately five-and-a-half months after Forest Grove,
the Ninth Circuit, in Ashland School District v. Parents of
Student R.J.,102 reflected on the appellate trip wires affecting
parents seeking reimbursement. In Ashland, the court of
appeals set out a balance between an administrative hearing
officer and a federal district court in making findings of fact. A
state hearing officer found that the school district had violated
various procedural requirements of the IDEA between 2003
and 2005 (one of which was holding an IEP meeting without a
parent present, thereby failing to make a FAPE available to
the student) and accordingly held that the parents were

98. !d. at 291. See Teague Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 181 (5th
Cir. 1993) (citing Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 9:J3 F.2d 12S5,
1289 (5th Cir. 1991)).
99. Richardson, 580 F.3d at 299.
100. ld.
101. !d. at 301.
102. Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student ILJ., 588 F.:ld 1001 (9th Cir. 2009),
aff'g 585 F. Supp. 2d 120S (D. Or. 2008).

2]

DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF PARENTS

325

entitled to reimbursement.l03 The IDEA provides that a
procedural violation (such as a school district's failure to
furnish notice to parents of an IEP meeting) can constitute
denial of a FAPE only where such violation has "caused a
deprivation of educational benefits to the child"l04 or
"significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate
in the decisionmaking process."l05 The hearing officer in
Ashland allowed the parents reimbursement for only one of
their two placements, reasoning that placement in the nonreimbursable residential facility "stemmed from issues apart
from the learning process, which manifested themselves away
from school grounds."I06 In effect, the hearing officer
determined that one of the placements had not related to a
FAPE violation because it had conferred no educational benefit
on the student. The school district appealed to a federal district
court, which reversed the hearing officer's finding of failure to
provide a F APE, in effect denying the parents any
reimbursement at alL 107 The parents believed that the district
court's decision was based on a too-narrow interpretation of
"special education" and "related services."lOS The parents
appealed, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court,
determining that the IDEA provision authorizing federal courts
to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate"109
requires district courts to conduct a "de novo review of the state
hearing officer's findings and conclusions."llO The court of
. appeals then applied the same de novo and clear error
standards of review as used in Richardson to find that the
federal district court "[had] not clearly err[ed]" in finding that
the parents were not entitled to any reimbursement at all for
placement of their child at either schooJ.lll In light of evidence
in the record concerning the child in Ashland and her
10::3. /d. at 1008.
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1115(f)Ul)(l£)(ii)(II) (2012).
105. !d. §§ 1115(t)(::l)(E)(ii)(lll).
106. Ashland, 588 F.:cld at 1008.
107. /d. (quotation marks omitted).
108. /d. at 1009 (referencing ::31 C.F.R § aoO.l04 (2009)).
109. !d. at 1008 (quoting 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2) (2009)).
110. Jd.
111. Jd. at 1010. The circuit court did, however, review the district court's
interpretation of the disputed IDEA provisions de novo.ld. at 1009-10.
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emotional issues and choice of friends, 112 the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court in its finding that placement in a
residential facility was not "necessary to meet [the student's]
educational needs."113 Thus, as in Richardson, the Ninth
Circuit in Ashland applied the Forest Grove standard without
altering the deference given to district court decisions.
Almost two years after Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit in
C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified School District,
again used the de novo (applied to legal interpretations of the
IDEA) and clear error (regarding the adequacy of
interpretation of the facts of the case) standards to uphold a
federal district court's reversal of a hearing officer's decision.114
Applying its clear error test, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
awarding of full reimbursement for the parents, observing that
"[o]ur focus is on the district court's decision, not the [hearing
officer's] decision." 115
The Ninth Circuit decisions in Ashland and C.B. upholding
federal district court decisions limiting reimbursement
(Ashland) and awarding full reimbursement (C.B.) present
interesting possibilities as to whether the court of appeals
would have reached the same results if the district courts had
decided differently. Would the Ninth Circuit in Ashland have
upheld a district court's order for full reimbursement, accepting
the district court's reasoning that the child's emotional conduct
outside of school affected the child's academic performance in
school? Similarly, would the Ninth Circuit in C.B. have upheld
a district court decision denying all reimbursement where the
parents' placement was not able to meet all of the child's
educational needs? Once a court of appeals finds no clear error
112. Ashland, 588 F.ad at 1007. The student's mother described her daughter's
emotional issues as follows: "I just think that there are some serious emotional issues
that are going on here that are affecting her interaction with peers and her interaction
with parents and her interaction with teachers. Going behind people's backs, not being
trustworthy. Lying about things that are supposed to be done and not done or
whatever .... She lies about things that have happened to her and gets kids in
trouble .... And l really am worried about her. She's expressed some really risky,
risky behaviors. l£xtremely risky behaviors including [her interactions withj the
custodian."
113. !d. at 1008 (quotation marks omitted).
111. C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 6:l5 F.:id 1155 (9th
Cir. 2011).
115. Jd.at1159 n.1.
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in a district court's findings of fact (e.g., the identification of the
student's disability, the conduct of the student, the student's
performance in school, and recommended services), a circuit
court's de novo review of the district court's placement decision
still does not rule out a decision at odds with the district court.
Other federal circuits have pursued their own
interpretations of a de novo standard in a manner similar to
Forest Grove. In a pre-Forest Grove decision, Muller v.
Committee on Special Education of the East Islip Union Free
School District,ll6 the Second Circuit, agreeing with a federal
district court that a student plaintiff should have been
evaluated as having a serious emotional disturbance instead of
the conduct disorder diagnosed by the school district, upheld
reimbursement for the parents.117 Even though the parents'
placement was more restrictive than the public school offering,
the Second Circuit agreed that the district court had correctly
determined that the student should be allowed to continue in
the private placement.l18 Although not using the words "abuse
of discretion" in assessing the district court's conclusion, the
focus of the Second Circuit was clearly and solely on the
district court. The Muller result has been followed in other preand post-Forest Grove decisions, with the Second Circuit
holding that a federal district court, in a parental
reimbursement case, is not required to grant any deference to
administrative hearing officer rulings where "the district court
is presented with the threshold question of a child's statutory
eligibility for special education services."119
However, to further complicate the task for parents, not all
federal circuits follow the Ninth and Second Circuits' de novo
approach for reviewing state administrative hearing officer or
federal district court decisions. In Mary T. v. School District of

116. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of the E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145
F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998).
117. I d. at 1ml.
118. Jd. at 105.
119. C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep't of Educ. of City of N.Y., 322 F. App'x 20, 21 (2d Cir.
2009). See also P.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Brookfield Bd. of Educ., 186 F. App'x 79, 80·81 (2d
Cir. 2006) (finding that district court had 1,rranted appropriate deference to
administrative finding that rejected parents' claim for reimbursement and citing to
Muller for the principle that "[djistrict courts arc to employ a preponderance of the
evidence standard in evaluating IDEA petitions.").
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Philadelphia, the Third Circuit reversed a federal district
court's granting of partial reimbursement after a state hearing
panel had ruled that the parent plaintiffs were not entitled to
any reimbursement.120 In reversing the district court, the court
of appeals reasoned that the Third Circuit mandated a "due
weight" standard requiring federal district courts to consider
the "[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings ...
prima facie correct," and if they fail to adopt those findings, the
courts must explain their reasons for departing from them.121
Unfortunately, most of the federal circuits have yet to
interpret Forest Grove's "equitable principles"122 in IDEA
parental reimbursement cases or to determine the appropriate
standard for reviewing federal district court decisions. In both
Ferren C. and Ashland, where federal district courts reversed
hearing officer decisions (in favor of the school district and the
parents, respectively), the Third and Ninth Circuits upheld the
district courts. In Richardson, where the Fifth Circuit
remanded a district court decision and vacated an order
favorable to the parents, it did so not on the merits, but solely
to enable the district court to address the question of whether
the parents' placement was necessary for their child's
educational benefit.
The "equitable principles" or "balancing of equities"
advocated by the Supreme Court in Forest Grove furnish no
direction as to what the equities are and who is to have the role
of interpreting and applying them. Thus far, case law furnishes
little direction for public schools and parents. The cases
suggest that although parents may not be successful in some of
the cases, it is too early for school districts to have some
measure of comfort that the Court's equitable principles are a
way of raising the bar for reimbursement.

120. Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2009).
121. Jd. at 241 (quoting Shore Reg'] High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194,
199 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (holding that federal district court failed to
use a "due weight" standard to provide substantial reasons for refusing to credit the
witnesses upon whom the hearing officer relied and failed to acknowledge weaknesses
in the testimony of school district's witness who failed to explain how school's
disciplinary system could have dealt satisfactorily with a campaign of harassment)).
122. C.B. ex rei. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 6:35 F.:ld 1155,
1159 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Parental reimbursement is unique among IDEA-related
cases because both Congress and the Supreme Court have
established guidelines for addressing the issue. Congress'
attempt to limit reimbursement for parental placements only to
students rece1vmg special education services has been
circumvented. Even though parents whose children have not
received IEPs would still have a remedy of a due process
hearing under the IDEA, the Supreme Court in Forest Grove
recognizes and reinforces the right of parents to make decisions
for their children.
More significantly, Forest Grove leaves in place a highstakes system for remediation of parent-school disputes that is
based on the economic status of parents. Tuition charges (and
residential charges, as well, in many cases) at private schools
for students with disabilities often run into the tens of
thousands of dollars per year. The Supreme Court failed to
take the opportunity to reinforce the structure in place under
the IDEA through the administrative due process hearing to
address parent concerns. Parents who have the resources to
pay for private placements have little in the Forest Grove
decision to deter them from pursuing relief, and public schools
that are struggling with financial budgets for special education
face the possibility of lengthy litigation to resolve placement
decisions.
Despite
some
guarded
optimism
that
parental
reimbursement for unilateral placement might be forthcoming
following the Supreme Court's Forest Grove decision,l23 the
opposite result appears to have occurred. While it is much too
early to draw broad conclusions, federal courts of appeals
decisions thus far have set high benchmarks for parental
reimbursement. The cost to public school districts of private
placements, especially those that are residential, 124 can be
substantial, and the Supreme Court's balancing-of-equities
12:!. See, e.!{., Ralph Mawdsley, The Supreme Court's Reassessment of Parental
Placement Under the IDEA: Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 251 ED. LAW REP. 1,
8-11 (2010).

121. See generally ]{alph Mawdsley, Applying the Forest Grove Balancing Test to
Parent Reimbursement for Placement in Residential Medical Facilities, 253 ED. LAW
REP.

521

(2010).
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standard could become a convenient means of ensuring that
public funds are not disbursed except according to carefully
crafted criteria. Thus, parents may find that proving that an
IEP has not furnished a F APE to their child will be scrutinized
more heavily than in Burlington and Florence County. If the
parents are unable to produce convincing evidence that their
private placement choice is able to furnish the level and kind of
services alleged to be deficient in the public school's IEP, the
equities thus far seem to weigh in favor of the public school.
Likewise, parents may find their request for reimbursement
thwarted where they have failed to provide the notice required
by the IDEA.
Equally important, though, is the notion that a balancing of
equities is a judicial concept, and federal district courts will be
given broad latitude in deciding how that balancing is to take
place. While administrative hearing officers will continue to
have the responsibility of gathering the facts, the limited
number of federal court of appeals decisions thus far suggests
that, in the arena of parental reimbursement, federal district
courts will have the primary role of determining how and
where the facts fit within the balancing process. What this role
of the federal district courts may mean for future litigation
remains to be seen, but one may argue that, based on the postForest Grove circuit court decisions thus far, parents are now
less likely to be reimbursed for the cost of placing their
disabled children in private schools.

